Plus a rant about response to incidents in the modern world of security, protection and political correctness.
When a regular person meets a famous person, it is unimportant to them but a bright moment for you. A forgotten inconsequential moment for them and a cool story for you. I never met a famous rock star, but I did hang out (briefly) with influential important people who shape the world that we all know about. I worked for the government and met people, who by position, birth and privilege were always bigger than who they are as individuals; they represented an office, a country, a way of life and had important influence on world affairs. I did not, I just organised, liaised, reviewed, planned and coordinated security.
Being a bullet catcher, last minute response guy was not my thing. I believe security has failed if you get that far. As with the recent most famous ‘attempted assignation, it was dramatic only because of lapses in security – before – the shot took place. It was a failure of security, human error and innocent spectators paid for it with their lives.
I am a shit groupie and never even entertained protection work for entertainers or media celebs who have real threats from stalkers, crazy crowds and over keen pyshco fans but rarely face threat from an assassin. Real security is mostly being outside the meeting, long periods of boredom and routine occasionally punctuated by an incident.
The real protection is in the preparation, the detail of the assessments, the gathering of intelligence and the awareness of the protection detail on the ground. Working openly with everyone from different agencies in a team to plan, to coordinate, deliver and maintain the security so it is inclusive and not detracting. Security measures and protocols are far more important than the reaction of protection officers – after an event. Good security is no incidents, no attention, no news flashes. The training, the drills, the planning, the assessments all work together to implement a good security footprint. Of course, you need great responders, but this is not about that. Responding well to anything in a crisis takes practice and training. The fact is the training is awesome, but the work can be mundane when not much happens, the odd thrown shoe or egg makes national news so it really can’t be that frequent.
I had numerous roles including bodyguard (protection Officer), liaison officer, planner, intelligence officer, coordinator and security manager. I did courses in the Army and with the AFP and QLD police close protection teams. Promotions ensured I did more liaison than protection and that is where I got to hang out with important people, briefly. Brief enough to have one Cigar with Director of the CIA. I always looked at my role as protecting the targets life and dignity whilst representing Australia’s reputation first regardless of rank.
SHORT STORIES AND BRIEF MEETINGS:
QUEEN ELIZABETH THE SECOND
CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) was held in Coolum in 2002. The Queen is always the special guest and was in Australia to time her visit with this event. I was on the CHOGM team, and a more competent colleague of mine was on the team with the Queen. I was also working with another guest for a week leading up to the event. Former President Bill Clinton. He was not invited to CHOGM but was doing meetings and a tour of talks that overlapped. So, while I was hanging out with Clinton, I got to meet the Queen. I worked on CHOGM with a large task force for many months. Mostly AFP and QLD Police liaison but if you all remember, it was one year after Sep 11 attacks, so everything was heightened. Coolum is a beautiful place and easy to secure as it is a small village with no big buildings or airports nearby.
I was having the time of my life, giving briefings to police, liaising with ASIO daily and managing the incident center. I had time to enjoy the Hyatt facilities every day to swim and run while all the serious people talked politics. I did not have any operational roles, as liaison only it was cruisy. Back to the Queen.
The Queen was staying at the Novotel, and she had her own room and always had her own bodyguards from Metropolitan Police Royal Protection. Protocol is everything, security must be unseen and discreet but very present. The Queen has real threats but wants to be seen and loved and has discreet but thorough security. In contrast to American Presidents whose security is real but is also there to demonstrate power. uses security to project power and importance. I had the privilege of being trusted to be ready when the Queen would be leaving her accommodation and liaise directly with her protection officers. During this time, I got to greet the Queen personally and link up with her AFP team who are responsible for her protection in Australia. Just a short 100m walk really, but I felt important and proud. The Queen always greeted housing staff and went out of her way to greet her fans. She was friendly, polite and the definition of regal and grace, to everyone. Amazing to see and an honor to meet her.
The British Protection officers are slick. They blend in, look like other dignitaries, carry a bullet proof umbrella and overcoat. They are ever vigilant and prepared but never intrusive. It was easy to see why the Queen was so popular her entire life.
I received a coveted lapel pin as part of her protection team from CHOGM which sits with my CIA medal getting dust on the shelf.
CIA AND FBI DIRECTOR
I coordinated the security for a meeting between the five eyes head of foreign intelligence services. Immediately post Sep 11 2001, there was a heightened threat, a lot of insecurity and the big players needed to sit and have a chin wag. I was given 1 weeks’ notice, which was easy, when all you had to do was pull together a few agencies and coordinate the security. Security was delivered by Victoria Police and AFP. The location, which was secret, was a military base/intelligence training location out of the way that already had the basics set up. Two challenging aspects, Top Secret meeting, so no media however too many people from foreign countries and varied government agencies would know, so news would get out for sure. Anyone intending an attack would look at is a great opportunity, if they knew about it and had the capability. I focused the security on IF someone was there with the capability and intent to act.
It was a 3-day meeting with everyone having a sleep over. We did bomb searches, had divers in the water, SAS on call, fly overs, jammers and everything cool for the meeting. I got to fly to Melbourne and spend 5 days straight working with a great team of professionals from Australia, the USA and Britian. When the guests started to arrive, I learnt a lot about the different cultures. The British arrived on commercial airlines, blending in and used their own resources to get to the RV for the move to the meeting location. In contrast, the USA arrived in their own plane and heaps of staff! They booked a floor of a hotel for staff with key players moving to the meeting location. We had to ensure they kept their weapons on board (foreign security is NOT allowed to bring weapons into Australia as our police are responsible for their protection) and move the key figures to the meeting location by police protection detail.
As liaison officer I got to meet all the heads of agencies and give a security brief for the meeting. I then got to hang around outside of very important meetings and liaise with the police and their security, so everyone stayed friends, focused and did their job. I got to stay in the big house with the cool kids and although I was not invited to dinners and drinks, I was busy just being ready.
After evening meetings concluded I was minding my own business when the Director of the CIA, George Tenant, asks me where he can have a cigar and a drink. The residence is like a military officer’s mess, so I showed him the bar and the outdoor area. Now, for me, meeting and working with the CIA, then meeting the big dog was like a little kid meeting Santa on Christmas day. He was alone and politely invited me to sit with him for a drink. He does not smoke so just had the cigar in his mouth and asked me where in Aus I was from, and we chattered about Australia. Amazing that a guy with such incredible things on his mind and influence on world affairs, just wanted to sit and relax for a few minutes before bed. A privilege for me.
At the end of the meeting, when he was leaving, he presented me with a CIA medal for my work, that I am proud of it to this day. Nothing happened, no incidents and everyone went home. The FBI Director was there as well but he was not as cool. The Director of MI6 was there but he is very British and just blends in and does his thing, to lofty to meet me.
FORMER PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON
Former President gets secret service protection for life. They also have real threats their entire life from inside the US and out. They are very high profile and always travel in the spotlight. When a former US President travel around Australia he gets a full AFP team, state police, a liaison officer (me) and everything they ask for really. Except guns, they do not get them. Bill was not travelling with Hillary; he was on a speaking tour and very busy. Private plane busy which was awesome for me. We went to Airs Rock, Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Sydney. All speaking engagements except Ayers Rock. We had a private plane; I already said that, but it was awesome. Ayers Rock was a holiday, he wanted to see it.
When you travel with someone like Bill Clinton you get the full treatment, polite staff, the red carpet, and groupies. Seriously, this guy had charisma. I did not think people really did, thinking it was more the position and circumstances, but it is really both and Bill had it in spades. I was always in a room a few doors down from him and despite the attention and options he had, he always went to bed early, worked on his speeches and met the right people. He was raising money for charities, hospitals and great causes and took it very seriously.
The highlight of the trip was the link with the Queen. President Clinton had met the Queen (of course) when he was president and wanted to go out of his way to say hello and pay his respects. So, an on the side meeting was organised, at the Hotel, in her suites. Away from media, away from politicians and away from formal meeting expectations. So, between the two liaison officers we coordinated a private meeting.
The Queen had 30 minutes spare in her schedule. President Clinton arrived early with his AFP and Secret Service guy (and me). Then she made him wait! We sat in another suite, just President Clinton and a Secret Service Officer and me. Had a soft drink and waited. He commented that he genuinely thought the Queen was an amazing person and that only she could keep him waiting and he did not mind. Just a show of pecking order! When she was ready, he went in, and I sat outside another important meeting doing nothing but feeling important.
THE HONOURABLE JOHN HOWARD
When the Prime Minister travelled overseas, I was honoured to travel in front and organise the security and do a report for the AFP protection officers who travel with him. I got to meet Prime Minister Howard on a few occasions for brief moments. He never made you feel like you were unimportant, although I was. All I did was travel on taxpayers’ money to consult with foreign police, stay in stupid expensive hotels and learn the route and local threats for a travelling and barely known Australian Prime Minister. I had to visit embassies, eat in fancy restaurants, fly business class, and travel the route of every meeting. I only got to do this on a few occasions as sitting outside meetings was getting very dull and I missed training. This job, now I am older, would be cooler, but it was just boring travelling all the time, alone mostly and with no one to train with.
I got to sit in a room outside the Popes in the depths of the Vatican and sit outside the offices of the French, Italian, German, Greek, Singaporeans and British Prime Ministers. I did not get to meet any of them but had some amazing tours and lunches. I got to meet protection teams and see them train and shoot and show off to impress us about how well the Prime Minister would be looked after. It was always impressive, but the best part was the fancy European Hotels. I stayed at the Brandenburg Gates and Opposite the Louvre in rooms that cost about 15,000 Euro a night! I got to see the European Union in session, visit the Reichstag but the best part was lunch in Crete with the Mayor. The Prime Minister wanted to visit battle fields and that was awesome because I got to go as well and check them out, which was the highlight for me.
IRAQ MEETINGS
In Iraq, I did not meet anyone famous, but I protected people and organised security for people that were a direct threat on every meeting. Architects, health professionals and project planners needed to get around Baghdad to liaise with locals, build health facilities and get home safely. As they were US, they were not popular, and the locals did not really want a US built (Christian medical center). So, they would shoot at us, try to kidnap us and blow up the vehicle any chance they got. This was far better than sitting outside of meetings. We all had guns, and we all got to sit in meetings and security was critical, not just window dressing. This was more me, busy, involved, less glamorous and having a direct effect every day. I got to do wary stuff and even when not out on a job, manage the security of the compound so everything linked together. Involved is far better than sitting outside the meeting. So, unless I was going to be a famous person or politician, this was the better work for me.
IRAQ – non famous people but real security with real threats daily.
In Iraq when protecting NON-Government, non-famous people, the mission was protecting the team first and to get everyone home safely. I was always vigilant when not directly on the protection team due to my skepticism and awareness of human error, insider attacks and the always to-common, complacency risk. I am a skeptic and never relaxed relying on others to do their job; call it a lack of trust. I looked at it like it was everyone’s job and never cared about other feelings of job identity, ego driven people, or budget driven decisions. Not the best promotional criteria! If the team works well and everyone does their job, learns from mistakes and always evaluates and develops then real trust is built.
A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT DIGNITARY PROTECTION, RESPONSES IN GENERAL AND MY HUMBLE BACK SEAT OPINION
The response to an incident in personal protection rarely changes the outcome as the incident itself is a failure of security. Human error is always a weakness in any system, and this occurs when protection detail is getting complacent, follow blueprints dogmatically, get too good to drill, get cocky, and don’t review (evaluate) procedures routinely. It can also occur when key decision makers care more about promotion or individual accolades than the security requirements.
Sitting outside important meetings can get very boring. I just could not feel value in the work because a respectable job is when nothing happens. I got to go to incredible training, meet great people, go to wonderful places, spend a lot of taxpayer money on business class and fancy hotels but it was rarely adventurous enough. You start to want something to happen, to test yourself and the system but then your imagination gets the better of your reality. This is also why protection officers should do operational work before any protection work to know how they will respond.
Most security is based on appearance, nothing happening, prevention is an easy cover story for an actual lack of response capability. When you spend 98% of the time protecting someone and nothing happens, you get complacent, the organizations get complacent, other priorities take over and security is not as important in the budget or time allocation. Budgets are cut, training is reduced, and experience is cut.
What IF there is an incident? Are we (Australia) ready to respond? Do we do enough failure exercises and tested responses without care of political backlash, reprimands and identifying failures and weaknesses? There is a vast difference in exercising what you have capability for, and evaluating the capabilities you have in an incident to look for failure and weakness. Overall, protection work, counter terrorism and many preventative securities fall into the same category. More testing is required, and more operational training is required with less post event criticism in the media and public. We should all be on the same team and move forward improved and better prepared.
Response actions will always get the visual footage for the TV cycle and will always retain mystique and glamour that good unseen security that works, will not. Response to a shooting, a terrorism incident, overt security and a strong physical presence always get strong images for media coverage but discreet, solid procedures in the background will never get the attention it deserves as they main key to prevention.
Never forget that no incident can also be because no one tried, no one was interested or motivated to attack. A threat takes two things, capability and intent. Limited attacks can also be contributed to a lack of people with intent or capability, not always because we are good at security. As the attempt on Trump shows, it does not take a foreign government assignation team to find the famous secret service found wanting, just a random un-loved nerdy looking loner with motivation can circumvent the best laid plans and shows of force. Security and intelligence forces get it wrong far more often than you would think and right often enough to create enough fear to justify their budgets. A security wall is above all else, a preventative deterrent only.
The show of force is also for the building of the importance of the character, and it is not often even about security, but a display of power. The USA does this better than actual security, Hollywood security. The best security is unglamorous, hidden and you never hear about it. Good security deters and must be maintained but it is not infallible to serious motivation. In Australia, one idealized and motivated person in a coffee shop can stop the nation, focus the nation and test response procedures and messaging. In reality, no one incident can be prepared for exactly, as prediction is tough. There will be mistakes, this is the chaos of the situation and for commanders on the ground a difficult challenge both operationally and politically. Command and attention will go all the way to the Prime Minister with everyone in between second guessing the operators. All critical responses will be found to have faults but must be constantly tested, more often, with critical evaluation of the response by the operators and experts, not the media or politicians.
One of the initial primary failures at the Lindt Café siege was let the media so close and watch everything, that just feed hindsight judgement from armchairs expert’s and a media more interested in the visuals than remembering whose team they should be on. A screen blocking all cameras and a larger setback for all spectators would have been my suggestion. This was a great example of why Australia is lucky to not have many incidents but unlucky to have over scrutinized, over politicized, over territorial controlled response teams that are often underprepared with ‘reality training’ and have too much hindsight oversight. This event was also an example of why it is hard to keep good people in government/police jobs because every detail of responders gets criticized and reviewed by armchair experts after the event. People who are smart have no idea of emotion and challenges of being shot at, facing death and the pressure to save lives. This attention does, however, keep the public away from the true problems in budgeting, training, recruitment and higher-level decisions that contribute, before any incident to commanders not having the tools, the back up or experience required to deliver. Who would want to be a police officer when the scrutiny is so unfair, so detailed and direct without reviewing the entire process for years prior at higher levels of decision making. The reason operators make mistakes in the pressure of real instances starts in budgeting and political decisions years before.
That was way off track. Why was I any better? I was certainly not, but I am more qualified to analyze than those that have their own agenda, for promotion, for political benefit, for culturally correct hierarchy of police forces, journalists with hindsight judgement and every armchair post event lawyer with do political benefactors who will criticize any response. There are hundreds of operators with far more experience than me whose internal critic is something everyone should learn from. Internal evaluation be internal for improvement not second guessed or used for political purposes. People in an organisation risk their career to speak out but they can have reputations ruined by one uniformed media story.
Those on the ground have the toughest job and do the best job they are allowed to do. Responses can make little difference to a true professional targeted assassination, as it is usually too late and something in the security preparation has failed. Questioning every decision with hindsight, with more information than what is available during the incident, from a comfortable armchair, and a post operative agenda is grossly unfair. Any criticism needs to be directed at the top of the chain not the operators. Response officers are often thrust into it with ‘everyone’ watching and second guessing, but they can only be as good as their preparation has allowed. Operators need protection from media and their actions protected by their hierarchy regardless of response. They have been recruited, trained and prepared by higher ranks, budgets and politicians who should always take any fall for any mistake, not the shooter on the ground. Then recruitment officers wonder why it gets harder to attract and keep people in specialist roles, why morale is hard to maintain and why good people leave too often. That is a failure of leadership not security.
If you have any comments or would like to discuss any aspect of this topic further, please email me. anthony@thephoenixedge.com.au
